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Chapter 12 – Developments in Australia 
after 1968 
 
A new supremacy 
The changing world order 
The copyright world’s American age begins in 1976 when the United 
States passed a new Copyright Act that embraced neighbouring rights 
and created copyright in computer programs. The gargantuan growth 
of the software industry in the United States, the emergence of Apple 
and Microsoft corporations as exemplars of the new industry, and the 
flood of exports from Silicon Valley soon demonstrated the 
unequivocal domination by the US of the world’s digital economy.  
In the last two decades of the 20th century, personal computers running 
proprietary US software across the globe suggested more than the 
economic power of the US. Their ubiquitousness symbolised the 
ascendancy, in most spheres of life, granted to those possessing 
property rights. Like the recording, film and broadcasting industries 
before it, the software industry came into the world unprotected by 
copyright law, and grew healthy, strong and intelligent – intelligent 
enough for its leaders to tread the path of opportunity to a magic door 
labelled “copyright”. The end of this journey rushes into view as if 
predestined. Like the leaders of the older industries who walked the 
same well-worn path long before them, the representatives of the new 
software corporations saw the magic portal open onto the pathway to 
riches. Thereafter, they did not rest until they persuaded the legislature 
to recognise property in computer programs. 
Following the US example, Australia amended the Copyright Act in 
1984 to recognise computer programs as literary works. Other 
countries did the same – Britain in 1985. The extension of copyright 
protection to software in advanced economies entrenched the great 
advantage enjoyed by the US industries in the development, production 
and export of digital products. On a broader level, it illustrated a new 
reality. The United States polity now increasingly worked as one with its 
industries exporting copyright products across the globe. The US 
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identified national trade interests with the specific needs outlined by the 
recording, film, broadcasting and software industries. 
Driven by the trade prerogatives of the United States, international 
institutions forged a new copyright architecture that incorporated  
the gains made over a century by the Berne Union and the proponents 
of neighbouring rights. Acting through the machinery of trade 
negotiations, treaties, and the World Trade Organization, the  
US created itself the new hegemon of international copyright  
law, effectively supplanting in influence the Berne Union and  
Rome Convention. Australia, obedient to the Berne Union and  
its legislative amanuensis, the United Kingdom, accepted the new 
master unquestioningly. 
The shape of the new world made for the benefit of the US copyright 
industries only became apparent in the 1990s. The polarity between 
trade advantages demanded by the United States and those accruing to 
the importers of copyright products, demonstrated the transformation 
of copyright law into an instrument for enlarging and enforcing 
comparative economic advantage. Yet none of the framers of the 
Australian Copyright Act in 1968 could have imagined the new 
worldwide legislative machinery that guaranteed profits eternal to the 
conglomerates and start-ups of California. 
Some at least must have felt presentiments about the role to be played 
by Australia in future developments. Only two years before the passage 
of the Australian Copyright Act, the Australian Prime Minister 
promised the visiting US President that wherever he went, Australia 
would follow. And when the American imperium governing through 
international copyright law came into being, Australia enthusiastically 
accepted its edicts. 
Domestic developments  
The Australian scene for 30 years after the enactment of Australia’s 
copyright legislation is dominated by the rise of a new collecting society 
to rival APRA in influence and effectiveness as well as its perceived 
brutal invasiveness. Founded in 1974, the Copyright Agency Limited, 
by litigation or the threat of litigation, and grinding determination, 
forced educational institutions to pay licence fees for the photocopying 
of copyright works.  
Backed by the compulsory licence for educational copying, which 
required universities and schools to pay equitable remuneration for 
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copying on their premises, CAL collected ever-increasing payments 
from the mid-1980s. In 1998, the organisation’s lobbying efforts 
secured another coup. The Government authorised CAL under the 
copyright legislation to collect fees under the statutory licence for 
government copying. 
CAL, like APRA, did not avoid the criticism that it functioned as the 
satrap for foreign masters, channelling receipts to publishers in Britain 
and the United States. Whatever the merits of the criticism, one fact is 
undeniable. Despite the existence of some native copyright industries, 
Australia is an outpost of the American copyright empire, enforcing 
copyright laws that benefit the United States, and remitting across the 
Pacific sales income, licence fees and other revenue collected.  
The problem of photocopying  
Reprography 
Reprography is the reproduction of graphics by mechanical or electrical 
means, including photocopying. Until the 1950s, authors and industries 
busy arguing for copyright protection paid scant the various processes 
of reprography. Then photocopying, invented in 1938 by Chester 
Carlson, a night student at New York University Law School, 
revolutionised the field. The Haloid Company, renamed Xerox 
Corporation in 1961, produced the first Xerox photocopier in 1950. In 
1959, the company began manufacturing the Xerox 914, a commercial 
document copier that could make 100,000 paper copies of documents 
per month. 
Japanese companies, including Ricoh Company and Fuji Xerox, quickly 
entered the photocopier market. According to evidence before a 
Committee of the US House of Representatives in 1965, in the 
preceding year copying machines in the US produced 9.5 billion copies 
of document pages. By the time Australia passed its new Copyright Act 
in 1968, photocopiers were omnipresent in all sectors of the economies 
of developed nations. According to one report in 1973, 600,000 
machines throughout the world produced 30 billion pages annually in 
libraries and offices.1  
                                                     
1 Reported by Gavin Souter “Copyright versus photocopying” in the Sydney Morning 
Herald, 27 December 1973.  
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Statistics published by Sydney’s two largest universities suggested that 
their photocopiers produced about 2 million pages in 1969.2 Though no 
parliamentarians debating the Copyright Bill raised questions about the 
legitimacy of photocopying, legal debate over the practice began as 
soon as the new legislation commenced in 1969. Organisations 
representing authors and publishers pressed universities for more 
information about their copying practices. The Australian Vice-
Chancellors’ Committee, relying on legal advice that university libraries 
could rely on the fair dealing provisions in the Copyright Act, thumbed 
its nose at the publishers. 
First salvos over photocopying 
The Australian Copyright Council, a collective of copyright creator 
interests3 formed in January 1968, fired its first salvo in July 1969, 
sending a letter to the country’s directors of education, vice-chancellors, 
principals of colleges and secondary schools, and librarians. The letter 
attached the advice of a leading Sydney QC. Couched in temperate 
formal language, the letter summarised the advice, explaining the 
narrow parameters of permitted photocopying. 
The ACC was rarely so circumspect again. Increasingly, the debate  
with the educational sector turned into a battle in which both sides 
staked definite positions from which neither would in principle resile. 
The domestic battle led to an official inquiry and then the introduction 
of statutory licensing schemes for educational and government  
copying. These developments, however, lay in the future. In 1969,  
the ACC felt its way cautiously, mindful that international copyright 
committees were yet to produce definite opinions on the legal status  
of photocopying, and inter-governmental agreement on the topic 
remained far off. 
Yet the question of photocopying occupied the minds of publishers 
from the moment that Xerox 914 swept the world. As millions of 
photocopiers produced billions of copies they stood by, desolate, as the 
world tolerated copying without recompense. Brooding on the 
usurpations of the copiers, they looked jealously on the magic of the 
                                                     
2 In 1968, Sydney University reported that its machines produced 873,780 copies. 
The University of New South Wales reported that in one 21 week period in 1969, 
students and staff made 325,100 copies.  
3 Though partly funded by government, receiving grants from the Australian 
Council for the Arts, an agency of the Department of the Prime Minister. 
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new machines. Like Caliban, envious and fearful, they plotted to regain 
their island from Prospero. How, they asked themselves, to subvert the 
magic and restore harmony to a universe in which nothing is for free? 
The International Publishers Association took up cudgels throughout 
the 1960s, taking part in all international copyright meetings convened 
by government or professional organisations. It dolefully reported in 
1973 that while photocopying “can be a valuable aid in specific, strictly 
defined cases, it can likewise be an evil making continually greater 
inroads.” The following year, the Australian Society of Authors 
declared that “a way must be found of allowing the creators of 
copyright to share with the users of copyright the benefits of the new 
techniques.”4 
International developments 
Governments responded promptly to the many similar expressions of 
concern and the promptings of international library organisations.5 As 
early as 1961, UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Copyright Committee6 
and the Executive Committee of the Berne Union examined, in the 
words of a jointly appointed Committee of Experts, “copyright 
problems raised by the reproduction of protected works by 
photography or by processes analogous to photography and to 
formulate recommendations for possible solutions.”7  
After 1961, UNESCO and the Berne Union discussed the question of 
photocopying biannually well into the 1970s. The two organisations 
determined in Paris in 1973 that the time “is not yet ripe for taking a 
definite stand”, and instructed the Committee of Experts and a joint 
working group to continue work on policy recommendations. In 
Australia, the ACC gave up hopes for the international consensus that 
would force the Government to regulate photocopying in universities, 
schools and government. 
                                                     
4 International Publishers Association, Second Memorandum on Reprographic 
Reproduction submitted to UNESCO and WIPO for the Meeting of Experts May 
1973 and submission of the Australian Society of Authors to CLRC inquiry into 
reprography 11 October 1974. 
5 International Federation for Documentation and International Federation of 
Library Associations.  
6 The Intergovernmental Committee of the Universal Copyright Convention. 
7 Report prepared by secretariats of UNESCO and Berne Union on meeting of 
Committee of Experts on the Photographic Reproduction of Protected Works, 
Paris 1–5 July 1968. 
 
336 
Role of the ACC 
Working closely with the Australian Council for the Arts, the ACC 
pressed successive governments for action after sending its letter to 
educational heads in 1969. Led by Gustaf O’Donnell, a man of  
bomb-proof self-righteousness in the cause of authors, the ACC 
proved itself by far the most formidable lobbyist on the Australian 
copyright scene. Chairman also of the Australian Society of Authors, 
O’Donnell pressed the cause of authors and publishers with 
indefatigable zeal and bombast.  
Beside him stood David Catterns and Peter Banki, legal officers  
at the ACC. Quietly, they researched the law, followed international 
developments and presented submissions on the need for regulation. 
Little by little, and then in strides, this triumvirate of advocates made 
the case for a wide-reaching official examination of photocopying 
practices.  
Banki and Catterns were beginning long careers of mostly unbroken 
success arguing the position of copyright owners in the Copyright 
Tribunal and elsewhere. Over 20 years later, Banki founded one of 
Sydney’s leading intellectual property law firms while Catterns, 
appointed Queens Counsel, led a string of cases in the Tribunal.  
They put an unequivocal position to government: the owners of 
copyright works must be paid for the copying of works by any 
technological means regardless of the purpose of the copying. The fair 
dealing provisions in the Act applied to restricted types of copying but 
the bulk of copying ought to be remunerated. The triumvirate did not 
argue strongly that photocopying deprived authors of income, insisting 
instead that copying signified the remunerable value of works. To fairly 
recompense creators, let the owner and copier quantify the value and 
agree terms of payment. 
The ACC found an ally in the Labor Government. After coming to 
power in 1972, the Prime Minister Gough Whitlam enthusiastically 
implemented a cultural policy that embraced the doctrine of the little 
people enunciated by Gil Duthie during the 1968 copyright debate. 
Duthie demanded that the little people, the artists and creators, receive 
their due. O’Donnell, an ALP member, Whitlam devotee and 
unshakeable ally of little people everywhere, could hardly fail to win an 
audience in Canberra. 
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He received ardent support from Senator Doug McClelland, who in 
1968 predicted that new technologies would, within five years, consign 
the new Copyright Act to history. The Attorney General, Lionel 
Murphy, a libertarian like O’Donnell, showed more interest in social 
reform than the plight of the little people, but his department steered 
him in the direction mapped by the ACC.  
After the failure of photocopying talks in Paris in 1973, officers 
concluded that Australia would have to find its own solution to the 
question of photocopying. In December 1973, a departmental 
spokesman told the media that arguments over photocopying ‘should 
be examined by an expert committee’.8 On 20 June 1974, Murphy 
announced the appointment of a committee to examine photocopying 
practices in Australia.  
The ACC and its constituency of owners’ groups, universities, libraries 
and the various representatives of copyright users now embarked on 
the process that led ultimately to statutory licensing. 
The Third World and copyright access 
A European convention 
When in 1886 the Berne Union breathed life into its creation, an 
observer of the new world created by authors’ rights might yet have 
seen small specks in the cloudless skies overhead. Over the next 85 
years, the specks became proliferating dark smudges producing deluges 
and storms that might have washed away the aggrandising dreams of 
the creator faction. In the end, the reciprocity of greed created 
understanding, and authors and industries alike annexed the expanding 
universe of abstract property rights.  
One blemish remained on the mirrored surface of this world,  
and efforts to remove the stain seemed to avail nothing. First  
Latin American countries, joined by the United States, and later, 
countries of the Third World, stood outside the Berne Union, and, if 
they joined the Union, manifested attitudes considered unbecoming to 
signatories to the Convention – the Berne Convention, after all, 
reflected the aspirations of European writers and publishers supplying 
developed markets.  
                                                     
8 “Copyright versus photocopying” Sydney Morning Herald, 27 December 1973. 
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Observers from other continents, which depended on a cheap supply 
of books, did not automatically share the desire for authors to exert 
control over production and distribution. The United States  
– a publishing outlaw pirating British works throughout the 19th 
century – and various Latin American countries entered into several 
multilateral conventions that loosely imitated the Berne Convention. 
But they declined to accept the prescriptive requirements of the 
European convention. 
Special needs and special rights 
After the Second World War, UNESCO sponsored conferences that 
led to the creation, in 1952 of the Universal Copyright Convention. 
The obligations of signatory nations were general not specific: member 
States were to provide “adequate and effective protection” of copyright 
works. Unlike the Berne Convention, the UCC required signatories to 
comply with simple formalities before they could take advantage of 
protection under the Convention. Owners were required to affix to 
works the © symbol, specify the copyright holder’s name and state the 
year of first publication.  
Signatories to the UCC included the US, a large number of Berne 
Union members, and nearly 30 South American, Asian and African 
countries not affiliated to the Union. The UCC offered to the less 
developed nations the benefit of less stringent protection standards. 
More importantly, it suggested to developing nations that were 
members of the Berne Union the possibility of demanding special 
rights that recognised their developmental needs.  
For the first time, international copyright forums began to recognise 
the existence of a generalised, transnational “user” interest. 
Policymakers began to recognise the common interests of the different 
“users” of copyright material: ordinary individuals, institutions and 
organisations, and, at the broadest level, nations. Each category of user 
sought access to copyright material. At the close of the 1950s, the UCC 
Intergovernmental Committee began considering the access needs of 
Third World members. In 1960, UNESCO resolved ways to examine 
ways to cheaply deliver educational books to underdeveloped countries.  
Brazzaville 
These developments informed the Intergovernmental Copyright 
Committee’s examination of photocopying practices. Then came the 
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bombshell that threatened to blow asunder the Berne Union. At 
Brazzaville in 1963, African countries at a copyright legislative policy 
meeting organised by UNESCO and the Berne Union declared a 
manifesto of special needs. Chief among their requirements were 
acceptance of a reduced period of copyright protection and the free use 
of works for educational and school purposes. 
For the first time, the copyright idol rocked on its Swiss pedestal. For 
half a century, the religion of authors’ rights withstood the challenges 
posed by the industries, adapting to become a hybrid faith accepted 
throughout the developed world. Refinements and demands for 
protection resulted in a process of accretion, not derogation. Rights, 
once created, were sacred. None among the adherents dared to breathe 
profane thoughts about weakening protection.  
Until now. The Third World neophytes shaking the gates of the 
copyright temple began to frighten the older religionists of the Berne 
Union. By the time of the Union’s Stockholm Revision Conference in 
1967, the recommendations of a committee of governmental experts 
caused more fear and trembling, not to mention anger among authors’ 
and publishers’ groups. 
Governments considered the legitimacy of the Berne Union to be at 
stake. If the less developed nations, led by India, were unable to secure 
exemptions from the stringent requirements of the Convention, they 
might leave the Union. Their departure, in an age grappling with the 
after-effects of colonialism, would confirm suspicions that the 
Convention functioned to protect and advance the economic interests 
of Western countries.  
Third World copyright rejected 
The committee of experts proposed that developing countries be 
permitted to apply to make reservations to the Convention on the 
grounds of economic, scientific, social and cultural needs. Reservations, 
applicable for a fixed period, could include the right to use works freely 
for scholastic purposes. The Stockholm Conference adopted a Protocol 
to the Convention that permitted Third World nations to adopt a 
posthumous term for foreign works of 25 years.  
Additionally, subject to conditions, countries could permit the 
compulsory translation and publication of untranslated foreign works. 
Worst of all, from the perspective of the developed nations, the less 
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developed countries could institute compulsory licences for copying 
literary and artistic works for teaching, study and research purposes. 
Naturally, such outrageous defilements of the divine credo revealed in 
1886 could not go unpunished. Shock at the outcome of the Stockholm 
Conference turned to anger, and the governments of developed 
countries lost any fear of causing offence to former colonies. 
Encouraged by the publishers and authors’ associations, the advanced 
nations, led by Britain, struck back. Knock-kneed Scandinavians were 
despatched to the rear of the vanguard, and the British informed the 
world that their country would not ratify the Stockholm Protocol. The 
United States helpfully reinforced the message: widespread acceptance 
of the Protocol, it said, would prevent it from joining the Berne Union. 
Together, the Berne Union and UNESCO hammered out the solution 
demanded by the publishers and authors of the developed nations. At 
their 1971 joint revision conference in Paris they agreed to amendments 
to the two Conventions that guaranteed the developing countries 
limited freedoms to translate and copy foreign works under compulsory 
licence. But the restricted possibilities now open to these countries 
were not enticing and few established licensing arrangements. 
The possibility of Third World copyright vanished. The prestige of the 
Berne Convention grew rather than diminished. The decade or so of 
controversy over special copying rights for less developed countries not 
only sharpened understanding of the concept of a “user interest”, it 
awoke policy makers to the idea of special needs that warranted 
qualification to, or derogation from, the exclusive rights. 
Common law developments 
ACC challenges university copying 
The Australian Copyright Council, dominated by the publisher and 
authors’ associations, doubtless exulted at the tidal wave of self-interest 
that swept away the copyright aspirations of Third World nations. 
When the Labor Party came to power in 1972, the ACC could rejoice 
in concert with a Government eager to uplift the little people even at 
cost to the poor and uneducated of other continents. 
Even so, the activities of one category of domestic user, the educational 
institutions, eroded the general happiness. In the universities and 
schools, students continued to freely copy the pages of texts. Educators 
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freely used photocopiers to replicate extracts they made available to 
students. To the frustration of publishers and authors, UNESCO and 
the World Intellectual Property Organization9 seemed unable to issue 
clear edicts demanding that users pay for photocopying. 
Two months before Murphy announced the Government’s copyright 
photocopying inquiry, O’Donnell and his lieutenants took action. They 
began a test case in the Supreme Court of NSW seeking a declaration 
that the University of NSW infringed copyright by failing to properly 
regulate photocopying on its premises.  
In Moorhouse v University of New South Wales,10 the Court heard that, at the 
behest of the ACC, a graduate of UNSW went to the university library 
and photocopied a story from The Americans, Baby, a book of 20 short 
stories written by Frank Moorhouse. Moorhouse, joined by his 
publisher Angus and Robertson, then agreed for proceedings to be 
launched in his name.  
Justice Hutley gave an equivocal ruling, finding that the copier breached 
copyright but that university did not authorise the breach. On appeal 
and cross-appeal, the High Court determined that the university 
authorised the copyright infringement by failing to adequately warn 
copiers of infringement liability or to supervise copying.11  
The ACC greeted the ultimate result of the Moorhouse case with qualified 
enthusiasm. The case located the onus for restraining copyright 
infringement by the users of photocopiers firmly within the ambit of 
university responsibilities. In this respect it clarified in Australia a 
principle that the ACC previously hoped to see promulgated by 
international copyright bodies.  
The High Court’s ruling, however, could be viewed two ways. Justices 
Gibbs and Jacobs (joined by Justice McTiernan) clearly did not think 
that they enunciated any startling principle of copyright law. Their 
judgments make clear their view that omissions rather than intent lay 
behind UNSW’s permissiveness. By placing appropriately worded 
warning notices near photocopiers and adequately policing 
photocopying rooms, universities would avoid authorisation liability.  
Many contemporary observers failed to see significant implications in 
the judgment. When the Government’s inquiry into photocopying 
                                                     
9 Now the body administering the Berne Convention. 
10 (1974) 23 FLR 112. 
11 University of NSW v Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1. 
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concluded a year after the High Court’s ruling, it reported that “it is 
difficult to see that this case provides an authority for any proposition 
other than that the placing of coin-operated self-service machines in a 
library without adequate notices at least drawing users’ attention to 
relevant provisions of the Copyright Act constitutes an authorisation 
within section 36.” 
Time soon revealed the importance of the High Court’s decision to 
copyright owners. The result in Moorhouse galvanised the ACC, and 
sparked life in the newly created Copyright Agency Limited, established 
to collect photocopying fees. Above all, it stood as authority for a 
proposition that owners took for granted but which governments  
were yet to state definitively: copyright owners were entitled to control 
the mass photocopying of their works in institutional venues such  
as universities.  
Williams and Wilkins Co v United States 
In the United States, meanwhile, a case first heard in 1973 and resolved 
by the Supreme Court in 1975 reached conclusions less palatable to 
owners. In Williams and Wilkins Co v United States,12 the plaintiff, a 
publisher of medical journals asserted that two government libraries 
infringed its copyright by photocopying articles from its journals. A 
Commissioner of the US Court of Claims agreed. On appeal, however, 
the full court found that the libraries’ photocopying constituted ‘fair 
use’ of the articles.  
The court ruled that medicine and medical research would be hurt by 
prohibition of copying and the plaintiff failed to show that it was, or 
would be, harmed by the copying. Significantly, the court stated that 
Congress, not the courts, should determine the legal status of 
photocopying. According to the Court, the 1909 US Copyright Act and 
the doctrine of fair use provided no adequate guidance on how to 
approach the question. The main judgment stated that “the courts are 
now precluded, both by the Act and by the nature of the judicial 
process, from contriving pragmatic or compromise solutions which 
would reflect the legislature’s choices of policy and its mediation among 
the competing interests.” 
The Supreme Court responded cryptically to the publishers’ appeal. 
The eight justices hearing the appeal split evenly on the question of fair 
                                                     
12 (1973) 487 F2d 1375 (Ct Cl) and (1975) 420 US 376 (USC). 
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use and dismissed the appeal, issuing no reasons for their decision. 
Technically, the split decision constituted affirmation of the view 
expressed by the inferior court that Congress should determine the 
legal implications of photocopying. Congress then supplied some 
guidance – it codified the fair use doctrine in 1976, specifying in new 
copyright legislation the factors that determine when the fair use 
defence can be raised.13 
Implications 
The Williams and Wilkins case aroused strong emotions. Copyright 
owners regarded the decision of the Court of Claims as transgressive, 
unjustly undermining, or more accurately, usurping, property rights. 
Some dissidents from copyright orthodoxy hailed the dawn of a new 
era in which the legislature and courts would place special emphasis on 
the social and educational needs of different types of users. The dawn 
they saw glimmering on the horizon, however, proved to be a false one. 
The Australian Government’s inquiry into photocopying paid some 
attention to Williams and Wilkins and the inquiry committee, after 
considering US legislative proposals prepared after the case, declared 
that Australia should not place “undue” restrictions of the 
dissemination of technical and scientific information. Given its limited 
effect on policy formation in Australia, the case is important as an 
historical signifier, reminding observers of a period in copyright legal 
history when lawmakers contemplated the possibility that 
photocopying ought not to be regarded as an unacceptable interference 
with property rights.  
The case is significant for another reason. The reactions it evoked 
typified the strain of histrionic self-justification that infected the 
discourse of copyright proponents from the first days of publishers 
demanding perpetual rights. Stripped of surface glitter, the discourse 
often reveals something ugly: covetousness and presumption 
masquerading as moral right. 
 
 
                                                     
13 1. The purpose and character of the use. 2. The nature of the copyright work. 3. 
The amount and substantiality of the portion used. 4. The effect of the use on the 
potential market for, or value of, the copyright work. 
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Copyright narcissism  
In Williams and Wilkins, the Chief Judge of the Court of Claims, Arnold 
Wilson Cowen said in his dissenting judgment that the court was  
“making the Dred Scott decision of copyright law”. Copyright 
supporters enthusiastically repeated the reference to Dred Scott,  
a Missouri slave. No-one noticed the grotesqueness of this parallel,  
which clothed copyright owners in the threadbare apparel of the  
truly downtrodden.  
Dred Scott, a slave in Missouri, sued for freedom in the 1840s, and 
through a long process of appeals, his case wound its way to the 
Supreme Court. By a 7–2 majority America’s highest court declared in 
1856 that Scott must remain a slave. The Court held that Negroes 
could not become citizens of the United States and that the 
Constitution permitted slavery in all the States of the Union. The 
Negro had “no rights which the white man was bound to respect, and 
… the Negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his 
benefit. He was bought and sold and treated as an ordinary article of 
merchandise and traffic, whenever profit could be made by it.” 
For Cowen, iniquity marched in the footsteps of those who denied 
remuneration to copyright owners. Like Dred Scott, he seemed to say, 
copyright holders fought a battle of cosmic dimensions against the 
forces of oppression and human abasement. If photocopying went 
unremunerated, they would find themselves abandoned in Babylon 
mourning the loss of the copyright kingdom. This outlandish conflation 
of the demands of copyright holders with the emancipation struggle of 
slaves and abolitionists in America aroused no skerrick of shame in the 
copyright movement. 
The moral distance between those demanding more rents and the 
slaves and emancipists demanding freedom hardly needs elaboration. 
Yet copyright observers readily accepted Cowen’s identification of 
copyright owners with the tragic history of the slave population of the 
United States, and the hopelessness and helplessness felt by the toiling 
inhabitants of southern estates.  
Such is the power of delusion. The supporters of more and greater 
rights for copyright owners never wanted for reasons to identify 
owners with the ragged army of the forsaken – but what possible 
parallel could Cowen have seen between the position of copyright 
holders, the owners of property, and Dred Scott, a slave?  
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Once exposed, the identifications concealed in his analogy reveal the 
narcissism of the copyright advocates who demand to control every use 
of copyright works as a right, human, natural or divine. In the passion 
play enacted in their minds, the owner is always a victim, crucified by 
the hostile public and the inaction of legislators. Their narrative of 
suffering supports fantastic comparisons, and reading Cowen’s 
judgment, some aggrieved owners might readily have cast themselves 
metaphorically in the role of Dred Scott and other slaves. 
Had they not felt vicariously the slaver’s lash in legislative hedging and 
qualifications? Could they, the victims of a million violations by 
heedless copiers, not understand the slaves’ pain? The agony of flesh 
shredded by double-headed whips equalled their own torment as 
government delayed justice. Were not they victims also of a cruel 
mistress, the law? Were they not forced to watch helplessly as the 
indifferent public, like slave owners, consumed – stole – the fruits of 
their labour?  
If he insisted on the slave analogy, Cowen could more accurately have 
identified copyright owners with the enemies of Dred Scott. Some slave 
owners owned great plantations. Some small. Some owned thousands 
of slaves, some only one. But all were owners, possessing the person of 
the slave like a dumb thing. All appropriated in total. Most demanded 
more appropriations, more uses. Few could imagine that they did not 
own by divine or natural ordinance. That their slaves might have uses, 
or wishes, or pursuits beyond their command they would not admit.  
Copyright owners too accepted no limitation on their ambition. They 
believed passionately, if they believed at all, that nature or divinity 
decreed their right to control the universe of known ways to replicate 
copyright works and the embodiments of works. Thus photocopying, 
even if it deprived them of none of the income supplied by the sale of 
books, must be brought within their control, and, God or nature 
willing, every copy of every page of every work known to the world, 
must be paid for. 
Use demands recompense 
Arguments for photocopying remuneration represented a shift in 
copyright thinking. In the 19th century the laws allowed British 
publishers to control the supply of books in the British Empire, to 
prosecute pirates and shut down illicit book presses. The enactment of 
exclusive rights in the early 20th century extended the author’s control 
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over the uses of works. But no-one in either period said that copyright 
owners were entitled to income for non-commercial use.  
In the 19th century, copyright prohibitions related solely to commercial 
activities, namely piracy and the unauthorised importing of books. The 
parliamentary and press debates on copyright legislation in 1905, 1911 
and 1912 show that politicians did not intend legislation to grant an 
absolute right to remuneration. The purpose of use mattered. 
Legislators expected owners to exercise the exclusive rights to control 
commercial processes like the production of books or commercial 
activities like the public performance of music.  
None betrayed an obvious wish for owners to secure payment from 
entities, like libraries, that did not use copyright material for commercial 
gain. Nothing in their public statements indicated that they would have 
shared Gus O’Donnell’s angry belief that universities were morally 
obliged to pay for photocopying. The war for photocopying payment 
grew out of a new sense of entitlement, a belief, unknown in 1911, that 
use always demanded recompense.  
The Franki Committee 
The Attorney General, Lionel Murphy, appointed the Copyright  
Law Committee on Reprographic Reproduction in 1974 with the 
following reference: 
To examine the question of reprographic reproduction of works protected by copyright 
in Australia and to recommend any alterations to the Australian copyright law and 
any other measures the Committee may consider necessary to effect a proper balance 
of interests between owners of copyright and the users of copyright material in respect 
of reprographic reproduction. The term ‘reprographic reproduction’ includes any 
system or technique by which facsimile reproductions are made in any size or form. 
Justice Robert Franki of the Australian Industrial Court, a man with 
extensive experience in the practice of intellectual property law, chaired 
the Committee. The other members were Joyce Shewcroft, the legal 
adviser to the ABC, Colin Marks, a Sydney solicitor with extensive 
experience in the practice of copyright law, and Murray Haddrick, a 
senior officer in the federal Attorney General’s Department.  
In May 1975, Lindsay Curtis, heavily involved in the 1968 Copyright 
Bill, and now First Assistant Secretary at the Attorney General’s 
Department, replaced Haddrick. John Gilchrist, a young officer of the 
Attorney General’s Department, later an academic and expert member 
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of the last Copyright Law Review Committee inquiry (into Crown 
copyright), acted as secretary.14 
Questions of statutory licensing 
Though viewed as the originator of Australia’s modern system of 
educational and government copying by statutory licence, the Franki 
Committee actually expressed equivocal views about the benefits of 
statutory licensing. It recommended the introduction of a statutory 
licence for educational copying as the action most likely to achieve a 
balance between the interests of owners and users. But none of its 
members harboured any illusions about the problems involved in 
instituting a system that appropriately remunerated authors. 
Contemporary readers of the Franki Report might be tempted to 
decide that history has disproved many of the Committee’s 
conclusions. The report disparaged the statistical sampling system now 
used to estimate the number and type of photocopies made in  
libraries and other localities. It rejected the idea of calculating 
remuneration by reference to per page rates for photocopies. It 
discounted the possibility of Australia instituting an effective  
collective rights administration scheme for the collection and 
distribution of photocopying fees. It stated that a collecting agency for 
photocopying “could not hope to operate” effectively in Australia for 
the foreseeable future. 
In all of these judgments, the Committee appears to have been 
mistaken. Educational institutions and government now commonly 
accept sampling as an appropriate method for determining copying 
volumes. Remuneration is calculated according to a formula that 
depends on agreed rates for copying pages of different works. The 
Copyright Agency Limited (CAL) has operated in Australia with great 
success for over 20 years. Few people involved in policy debate 
seriously question the feasibility of collectively administering the rights 
of the owners of copyright in works. 
On the other hand, the reasons given by the Committee for its 
scepticism remain powerfully relevant. The Committee emphasised the 
difficulty of accurately estimating, by sampling, the number of copies 
                                                     
14 John Gilchrist wrote additional comments to the CLRC’s Crown Copyright report 
in 2005 proposing ways to make its recommendations more effective, including 
directly stating in legislation that government is authorised to use copyright material 
for statutory purposes. 
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made of works attributable to a specific author, and the concomitant 
problem of apportioning and distributing income accurately to authors. 
This difficulty continues to cast doubt on the efficacy of the collective 
rights administration of works. 
Distributions  
While the income from CAL’s collections from educational institutions 
has, over about 15 years, risen exponentially, the question remains 
whether individual authors really benefit from collections, or indeed 
whether collections on behalf of so diffuse a population could ever 
benefit anyone other than a concentrated minority of writers whose 
works remain consistently in demand for educational or other 
purposes.15 The problem is compounded by another – the maddening 
opaqueness of CAL’s collection and distribution process, and its 
unwillingness to disclose meaningful information about distributions. 
Lenin’s question “who, whom?” springs to mind whenever the 
question of distributions is discussed. Who reaps the benefits? Among 
whom are the spoils divided? In this respect, CAL follows exactly in the 
tradition of APRA, which attracted public opprobrium in the 1920s and 
1930s for its refusal to divulge details of how it distributed licence fees. 
Then, as now, critics argued that the collecting society functioned as 
the stooge of publishers, not the benefactor of authors. 
Statisticians employed by CAL argue that sampling allows for the 
efficient determination of copies made because the snapshot of copying 
taken over the period of several weeks predicts future patterns. The 
total number of copies made in different categories such as “books” 
“newspapers” and “journals” is unlikely to vary significantly between 
significant sample periods. The question that remains unanswered, 
                                                     
15 See Report of the Copyright Law Committee on Reprographic Reproduction (1976), para 
2.27, p24: “Even if it were practical to record each copying instance of a private 
individual to which section 40 applied and by some method to enforce payment by 
him to a central collecting agency, we are quite satisfied that in most, if not 
substantially all of the copying instances great difficulty and expense would be 
involved in paying royalties of a small amount to copyright owners (and in 
particular the authors) and the costs of collection and distribution must exceed any 
reasonable royalty which the individual copier would be likely to pay, or indeed, a 
Government could reasonably be expected to provide, if it wished to fund some 
forms of copying by an individual on, for example, a self-service machine in a 
university library.”  
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however, is how allocations to the individual authors within categories 
are made, and the actual share of total income distributed to them. 
Record keeping 
The Franki Committee essayed the problems of accurately determining 
volumes copies and the amount copied of different authors’ works and 
came to an unpalatable decision. It adopted the principle of record-
keeping, which holds that the only way to establish largely accurate 
statistics on volumes and types of copying is to institute a rigorously 
policed system of record-keeping. When copies are made, copiers 
record the details of works copied and supervisors patrolling 
photocopying areas ensure compliance.  
On this point the Committee was uncompromising, though it allowed 
one departure from the general principle. Universities were not 
required to police the keeping of records. Instead, under the 
Committee’s proposal, the Act would be amended to require 
universities to keep records of copying in the prescribed format (title, 
author, publisher, pages copied, number of copies made etc). Copyright 
owners would be entitled to inspect records on demand. 
ACC proposals and the Committee’s conclusions 
The ACC greeted the Franki Committee’s recommendation for the 
institution of an educational statutory licensing scheme with faint 
praise. Peter Banki, one architect of the ACC’s policy, and the author 
of a detailed submission to the Committee by the Australian Council 
for the Arts,16 argued strongly for a voluntary licensing scheme 
supplemented by statutory licences. Banki, and Gus O’Donnell, 
considered statutory licensing a denial of a fundamental right of 
property: the right to refuse. Why, they asked, should owners be forced 
to allow others to copy their work? 
The ACC, having argued cogently for per page remuneration fixed 
according to category of work copied, found itself further disappointed 
by the Committee’s approach to remuneration. The Committee rejected 
the principle of fixed per page rates with the parties or the Tribunal 
determining the particular rates. According to the Franki Report, the 
difficulties of such a scheme were too great. However, the Committee 
offered no deeply thought-out alternative. The Report provided simply 
                                                     
16 Drafted as a Special Research Project supported by groups of consultants. 
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that the user must pay a royalty for copying if the owner demanded one 
within the prescribed period.  
Equally disappointing for the ACC, its proposal for the institution of a 
sampling system for determining levels of institutional copying went 
unheeded. The Franki Report, when it appeared in October 1976, 
appeared to give the ACC’s constituency of publishers, authors and 
others much less than they hoped. The ACC’s chief officers, and in 
particular Banki, who laboured intensively to produce the very lengthy 
submission by the Council for the Arts, may have looked on the Report 
with some bitterness. 
Of the interest groups, only the ACC attended all the public hearings 
held by the Franki Committee in different capital cities of Australia. It 
pressed the case for copyright owners more fluently, compellingly, 
passionately, and sometimes aggressively, than any comparable 
representative group. But at the end of 1976, its grand vision of 
universities and government paying for photocopying by an orderly 
process mediated by the Copyright Tribunal seemed in doubt.  
In the end, the seemingly bitter pill of the Franki Report proved 
palatable. The recommendation for statutory licensing incontrovertibly 
established the principle, hitherto uncertain, that all photocopying, 
subject to limited exemptions, must be paid for. Together with  
the High Court’s judgment in Moorhouse, the Franki Report handed  
the advantage in the looming battles over remuneration to  
copyright owners. 
To the ACC in 1976, this truth may not have been apparent. Its 
creation, CAL, would struggle for a few years to persuade  
educational institutions that the law applied the user-pays principle  
to photocopying. When the legislature amended the Act in 1980  
to introduce a compulsory licensing scheme on the lines recommended 
by the Franki Committee, the onus remained on copyright owners  
to police the record-keeping of institutions and to propose methods  
of remuneration.  
Eventually the difficulties vanished. In time, legislative amendment 
delivered what the ACC sought: a licensing system for educational and 
government copying, with users obliged to pay specified rates for pages 
copied, and to submit to sampling surveys to determine the amounts 
copied. And, as the ACC wanted, the Copyright Tribunal determined 
disputes over rates and the terms of licensing.  
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Committee’s orthodoxy 
On one level, the ACC, the Australian Society of Authors and the other 
groups who demanded regulation of photocopying were justified to feel 
disappointed by the Franki Report. The Committee acknowledged 
plainly that a reader of the Report could judge where its sympathies lay: 
We are aware that the proposal [for statutory licensing] … might seem to favour the 
interests of education against the interests of copyright owners. It would entitle copies 
to be made of a work or part of a work without the permission of the copyright 
owner, whilst leaving the copyright owners with the practical problem of collecting the 
royalties due to them under the proposal.  
The Committee reached a conclusion that nowadays would evoke angry 
reactions from the copyright owner groups. “The evidence we have,” 
said the Report, “shows that much of the photocopying that takes place 
is likely to be within the exceptions to the rights of the copyright  
owner established in the Copyright Act.” The Committee went on to 
note that “much” student photocopying constituted “fair-dealing” 
under section 40 of the Act. It also pointed out that Australia’s 
geographical isolation and its vastness necessitated policy sensitive to 
the needs of a population especially dependent on the effective 
dissemination of information.17 
Undoubtedly, for the members of the Franki Committee, education, 
and the need for dissemination of information took precedence over 
the demands of copyright owners. The Committee took, however, an 
orthodox approach to its assessment of owners’ rights. It could hardly 
have done otherwise. Its members were experienced copyright lawyers 
disposed to favour the consolidation and refinement of property rights.  
Its report articulated the following premise for the Committee’s inquiry: 
However, in principle we consider that multiple copying should not be carried out 
without remuneration to the copyright owner in any case where it represents a 
substantial use of his property or it could prejudice sales of his work, particularly 
if the work has been specifically written for use in schools.  
                                                     
17 A point raised at least twice in the Franki Report. See, e.g. paragraph 1.02,  
page 9: “There is, we believe, particularly in Australia, a very considerable public 
interest in ensuring a free flow of information in education and research, and the 
interests of individual copyright owners must be balanced against this element of 
public interest.” 
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The Committee adopted the principle in Article 9 of the Berne 
Convention, which permits legislatures to permit the reproduction of 
works in special cases provided that such reproduction does not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.  
Applying the principle of remuneration, together with the so-called 
“three step test” in Article 9, the Franki Committee could not fail to 
reach the conclusion that owners must be remunerated for 
photocopying. The Committee nonetheless recognised that the owners’ 
frequent references to moral and natural rights, disguised, 
unintentionally or otherwise, a simple, insistent demand for payment. 
As the Report wryly noted: 
Virtually the entire object underlying the authors’ claims for control over 
reprographic reproduction is to ensure increased remuneration for this use of their 
works. The view that ‘what is worth copying is worth protecting’ has been put before 
us emphatically and persuasively. However, what this usually means is “what is 
worth copying is worth paying for.” Very few authors want restrictions for their own 
sake but rather as a means of securing remuneration. 
The right to photocopying remuneration 
Given its membership of intellectual property lawyers, it is hardly 
surprising that the Committee never canvassed the relevant 
philosophical question – is recognition of an owner’s right to 
remuneration for photocopying consistent with whatever purposes  
can be discerned in the legislative grants of reproductive rights to 
copyright owners? 
The question is not redundant. The Copyright Tribunal when 
determining disputes over equitable remuneration for copying could 
also have asked how a categorical value could be assigned to pages 
copied. On what basis can a single page of a work of fiction be said to 
be worth, for example, 2 cents, and that of a page of poetry 4 cents?  
Would legislators who passed laws giving publishers control over the 
production and supply of books have agreed that the law could be 
interpreted to allow publishers to exact tolls for copying the individual 
pages of a work? Would they even have agreed that a value could be 
assigned to a page separated from the whole work? Was it any part  
of their intention that law first designed to control piracy should in  
the future authorise something unforeseen, like the mass taxation  
of photocopies? 
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Because a principle of law can be flexibly applied to circumstances 
unforeseen at the time of the law’s making does not, of itself, justify the 
new application of principle. The purpose of the principle is relevant to 
its application. In the 1920s, radio stations argued that legislators did 
not intend that the public performance right should extend to the 
playing of music over radio. Why, they said, should copyright owners 
profit from the invention of broadcasting? Why should a technological 
advance to which they contributed nothing benefit them? 
It can certainly be said that the early legislators never intended that a 
group of industries should benefit from copyright protection. Principles 
of reproductive and distributive control developed by the Berne Union 
and early legislators were intended to benefit authors (though legislators 
accepted that authors could assign copyright to publishers). It is quite 
possible that early legislators would have welcomed a world in which 
copyright owners exacted rent from photocopying. But it is difficult to 
see, in principle, how they would have supported exactions that treated 
an indivisible thing – the copyright work – as something divisible.  
In short, they may not have agreed that the copyright holder should 
control the use of disaggregated parts of a work – embodied in the 
pages of a book – as distinct from the work as whole. The Franki 
Committee did not engage in considered historical analysis. Its lack of 
interest in copyright history is not surprising. Policymakers tend to 
make assumptions about the original purpose of copyright law based 
on the folklore of anecdote, supposition and half-remembered history. 
But the folklore is deceiving.  
For instance, the theory that parliaments designed copyright law to 
create a balance between the interests of owners and users is a  
fiction. The law actually arose according to the compound plan of 
different human agents seeking advantage for their own faction. No 
legislators could foresee, and not all would have approved of, what the 
law became. 
Justifying the photocopying royalty 
In the case of photocopying, the burning, unanswered question is how 
the owner, who is entitled to control uses of the work, justifies control 
over pages, and the payment of royalties for copying of pages. How 
does the copying of pages harm the owner? The cost of book piracy is 
roughly, or sometimes exactly, quantifiable. Piracy imposes a cost 
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affecting tangible production. But what economic harm to the owner is 
done by the copying of pages?  
The Franki Committee asked this question of respondents to the 
inquiry.18 Peter Banki, in his submission for the Council for the Arts, 
said that, “too many variable factors exist, preventing simple statistics 
on income loss.” Banki’s reply spoke for the position of owners as a 
whole: 
If one sees copyright as a device to prevent monopoly, and if one admits that users 
have a vested interest in the continuation of profitable publishing, then the measure of 
damages is not only invalid as a tool by which to assess the position – it is a 
handicap. In any case, it is fruitless to attempt any calculations of damage – no 
measure of damages can accurately assess the claims of authors and publishers. 
This statement, which would doubtless win the approval of copyright 
proponents and many neutral observers, flatly stymied the Franki 
Committee’s request for information on economic damage.  
In substance, Banki seemed almost to say, “As the case for the 
photocopying royalty is self-evident, the Committee should dispense 
with the trifling and irrelevant matter of demonstrating the harm 
caused by royalty-free photocopying.” The history of copyright  
policy debate has seen many other equally bold statements made and 
accepted. Outside the world of misbehaving monopolists, it is  
difficult to imagine a supplicant to government alleging harm, 
demanding compensating rights, then declining to substantiate the 
allegation of harm.  
The reason for the difficulty explained by Banki is twofold. First, unless 
photocopying amounts in fact to piracy – the copying of whole works, 
or substantial parts, for commercial purposes – it does not significantly 
affect sales of books. In this case, royalty-free photocopying represents 
a lost opportunity for securing revenue. Secondly, even allowing for the 
possibility that copying causes economic damage to owners, if copiers 
copy the works of a multiplicity of authors, then quantifiable economic 
losses, when disaggregated, are likely to be small. By contrast, if the 
                                                     
18 The question posed in a discussion document: “What is the actual effect of 
copying on sales and on the financial rewards to authors and/or publishers? Can 
precise quantitative illustrations be given of the detrimental effect, if any? If 
copying had not taken place would the number of copies sold have been increased 
and, if so, what would be the measure of financial advantage to authors and/or 
publishers?” 
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numbers of authors habitually copied is small then publishers should be 
able to quantify their losses. 
Banki’s unwillingness to put forward estimates of loss, and the silence 
of copyright owners on the question of economic harm, pointed to one 
conclusion. Many owners were not deeply troubled by economic  
losses caused by photocopying. What most upset them was that they 
could as yet find no entry to the pathway to profit represented by 
photocopying levies. 
One of the most cogent submissions to the Franki Committee on the 
question of the economic harm caused by photocopying came from 
Leonard Jolley, the chief librarian of the University of Western 
Australia. Concentrating on the copying of articles in academic journals, 
Jolley asserted that “it is impossible to see how making several copies is 
more injurious to any author or publisher than making one.”  
According to Jolley, articles could not realistically be called 
commodities. The print runs of journals were usually very limited, and 
the period in which they sold to the public very short. No university 
student would profit from making several copies of an article and 
offering them for sale. Given the diffuse, fragmented demand for 
academic journals, with the audience for most periodicals usually small, 
academic publishers depended on the subscriptions of libraries to 
sustain production. 
Although Jolley did not make the point explicitly, his message seemed 
clear. Why did publishers protest so much about photocopying? Not 
because copying undermined the often meagre profits of academic 
publishers but rather because photocopying royalties promised a new 
source of income. Jolley came to the crux of his argument, insisting that 
royalties should only be awarded as compensation for economic loss: 
The only proposal “capable of implementation in a practical manner” would appear 
to be to grant free permission to copy to any non-profit making institution except 
where demonstrable harm is caused to either authors in or publishers of learned 
journals. It is quite certain that no demonstrable harm is caused to either authors in 
or publishers of learned journals. It is pretty certain that no demonstrable harm is 
caused to publishers of other journals and newspapers since the sale of these is almost 
entirely restricted to a very brief period.19 
                                                     
19 Jolley acknowledged that “What is quite demonstrably harmful to publishers and 
authors is the practice of certain education authorities which will in effect create 
their own textbooks by making several hundred copies of different chapters from 
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The Committee’s recommendations 
The Franki Committee made 35 proposals for legislative amendments 
or procedural innovations.20 The report grouped the recommendations 
in subject categories – fair dealing, copying by libraries, copying for 
preservation purposes, multiple copying, copying in other 
circumstances and Crown copyright. The most important changes 
proposed related to fair dealing, library copying and multiple copying. 
First, the Committee proposed amendment to the Act to clarify the 
liability of libraries for photocopying by users of the library. If the 
library displayed notices in the prescribed form drawing users attention 
to the relevant provisions in the Act, the library could not be said to 
have authorised illegal copying.  
The Committee recommended that section 40 of the Act be augmented 
to specify the criteria to be considered when determining whether an 
instance of photocopying constituted a fair dealing. The relevant 
factors included the purpose and character of the dealing, the nature of 
the work, the amount and substantiality of copying, the temporal and 
commercial availability of the work and the effect of the dealing on the 
potential market for the work. 
The Committee also recommended that the Act be amended to deem 
that a single photocopy of a single article, or articles on the same topic 
in the same journal, or the chapter of a work, or 10 per cent of the 
work (whichever portion was the greater), constituted a fair dealing.  
The Committee’s recommendations concerning library copying also 
involved the application of existing principles to photocopying, and 
slight amplification of those principles. Under the scheme envisaged by 
the Committee, the photocopying of a chapter of a work, or 10 per 
cent of the work, constituted a “reasonable portion” for the purposes 
of section 49.  
Subject to procedural requirements, a library would be permitted to 
photocopy a whole work or large portion of the work if the work could 
not be obtained within a reasonable time at a normal commercial  
price. However, libraries would not be permitted to make a profit  
from supplying copies. The Committee also specified that library 
                                                                                                           
books on the same subject and circulate them within their educational system.” 
Later, CAL collected fees for copying to create such “coursepacks”. 
20 See Appendix 4. 
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copying for these purposes was “to remain without remuneration to the 
copyright owner.” 
By far the most significant changes proposed by the Committee 
concerned multiple copying by libraries and the users of libraries. 
Libraries were, subject to procedural requirements, to be allowed to 
make up to six copies of a single journal article for library use. Libraries 
could, subject to the same conditions, make up to six copies of a 
substantial portion of a work (other than article) that was not 
reasonably available at a normal commercial price. 
The Committee proposed the introduction of a statutory licensing 
scheme that permitted the photocopying of copyright material for 
educational purposes by universities and schools subject to the keeping 
of records specifying the titles of works copied, the number of pages 
copied, the number of copies made and the name of the author and 
publisher of each work copied. Requirements applicable to ordinary 
library copying of works would apply – thus, subject to the relevant 
conditions, whole works or substantial portions of works could be 
copied, as could single articles in journals or articles on the same topic. 
The report provided that copying under the statutory licence would be 
remunerable. Educational institutions must keep records of copying 
and “pay an appropriate royalty if demanded by the copyright owner or 
his agent within a prescribed period of time (say three years).” 
 
